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Abstract 
 
The way bodies are perceived has not received much attention in ethical 
discourse. It has always been accepted that one of the fundamental principles in 
evaluating ethical dilemmas in bio ethics is the respect for autonomy. This notion 
has dominated medical ethics for several decades. Medical ethicists however have 
quite frankly forgotten about the perception of bodies. In this post modern era, 
ethicists and medical practitioners are challenging and considering in what ways 
the impact of disease has on an individuals “autonomous decision making”. 
This discourse considers current and historical thoughts on autonomy and 
challenges its relevance in bioethics today. Autonomy is viewed from a genuine 
and an ascriptional perspective. By reviewing various arguments it is concluded 
that autonomy is still an important, but not an absolute, consideration in bioethics.  
Embodiment is discussed from a phenomenological perspective with the various 
notions of embodiment reviewed and evaluated. The impact that various states of 
embodiment have, from its normal physiological state that includes different ages, 
racial makeup and gender, to diseased states, on autonomy is reflected and 
discussed. This impact, it is argued, questions the role that autonomy plays in 
decision making. Emphasis is placed on respect for embodiment to seek a 
resolution to the impasse presented by certain ethical dilemmas where the respect 
for autonomy is found to be flawed.  
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Preface 
 
The practice of modern day medicine is fraught with ethical challenges. How  
medical practitioners are taught to deal with various disease processes is often 
bound in various protocols. Answering ethical dilemmas is often based on the 
same format. “What protocol should I employ to respect my patient‟s wishes?” is a 
medical conundrum whose answer is sought by referring to some protocol or easy 
solution. Principlism has provided an often easy answer. “Let us consult the 
principles outlined by Beauchamp and Childress!!”  This has however ignored the 
status of the patient, but it has provided the medical practitioner with a defence for 
her actions. What is wrong with this approach has seldom been addressed by 
teachers of medical ethics. The core to medical practitioners‟ understanding of 
what patients want or need has been the respect for their autonomy. But people 
exist in this world because of their bodies. It is exactly these objects of matter that 
present first to medical practitioners with their frailties and incapacities and 
medical practitioners have chosen to ignore their presentation, choosing to accept 
the reasons for their presentation. Why exactly bodies have been ignored is the 
subject of much debate. Perhaps it has been the influence of modernist 
philosophical theories that have pervaded the practice of bioethics. After all it 
would be strange not to acknowledge the work of great philosophers such as 
Immanuel Kant and his theories of universalization and autonomy, especially in 
the art of medical practice, or now “the science of medical practice”. Embodiment 
has lagged behind in the pursuit of what the mind desires. This discourse has 
opted to put bodies once again at the forefront of bioethical decision-making.   
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Introduction  
 
The body is not something that I have, it is what I am in relation 
to objects and others….The body is not so much an appendage to the 
self but is itself the locus of subjectivity – the very fabric of the self. It is 
the locus of one‟s being-in-the-world. The distinction between the individual 
agent and the body over which she or he is sovereign – the distinction 
upon which the principle of autonomy is based – is a secondary and 
derivative mode of being in the world…The body we are with is a kind of 
sign out there in the world inviting interpretation by, and response from, 
others…Any practice that perpetuates that alienation apparent in the distinctions between self and body, 
self and world, is unethical (Diprose, 1995: 202-221). 
 
Beauchamp and Childress identify respect for autonomy as one of the major 
ethical principles that should be upheld when evaluating any ethical dilemma, 
especially in the practice of medicine. This principle has endured criticism and 
praise over the years. At a Hastings Centre conference in 1985, entitled 
Autonomy-Paternalism-Community, the concept of autonomy was even rejected 
(Childress, 1990). However, if one were to ask any undergraduate medical student 
to list any ethical principles which play an important role in the practice of 
medicine, she would undoubtedly mention Beauchamp and Childress‟ theory of 
Principlism which embodies four basic principles: benevolence, non-maleficence, 
justice and respect for autonomy (Beauchamp and Childress, 1994).  
 
Of these four principles, the concept of respect for autonomy forms an inherent 
part of every aspect of medicine from the notion of informed consent for a surgical 
procedure to the care of the elderly or neonate. Thus, any challenges to the 
principle of respect for autonomy could have grave implications for the practice of 
medicine. It would revisit the very core of medicine, particularly in that of the 
doctor-patient relationship.  
 
In this postmodern era, some medical practitioners (as well as ethicists) are 
challenging and considering the ways in which the impact of disease affects an 
individual‟s autonomous decision-making. Ethical discussions surrounding e.g. 
„personhood‟, „rationality and „reason‟ are generally considered as external 
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concepts removed from embodiment per se which has resulted in some 
phenomenologists such as Shildrick (2005: 1) writing:   
 
“Bioethics is out of touch… with bodies themselves, in the phenomenological 
sense in which the being, or rather the becoming, of the self is always intricately 
interwoven with the fabric of the body.”  
 
I suggest that Shildrick‟s observation has merit and in this study I will grapple with 
the idea that the psychological state of being “ill” (arising from the brain and body‟s 
physiology or embodiment), which is also well described by Pellegrino (1979:44-
45), affects his / her autonomy. 
The study is divided into four chapters. In chapter one I will discuss various 
interpretations of the concept of autonomy by tracing its original concept, asking if 
it could be considered as an absolute principle and discussing what current 
thoughts are present in ethics literature concerning autonomy. 
In chapter two, I will introduce the concept of embodiment as viewed in a 
phenomenological perspective.  
In chapter three, I will consider if there are degrees of severity of embodiment that 
affect autonomy differently. I will present particular cases in which I suggest that 
consideration of the psychological processes and a person‟s physiological state do 
influence their “autonomous” decisions. 
In the final chapter, I will evaluate arguments for and against the answers raised in 
my previous chapters. Here I will pursue the idea that, if autonomy is not absolute, 
then should we be considering it as an important principle when deciding on 
ethical dilemmas? I will present arguments that we should be considering other 
concepts such as embodiment and personhood, to explain processes that 
individuals undertake in decision making. I will also raise for consideration the 
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respect for embodiment as an ethical principle, arguing for its relevance as the 
most important consideration in dealing with ethical dilemmas. This in conjunction 
with recognising personhood and the respect for personhood could produce a 
challenge to the ethical principle of respect for autonomy. 
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Chapter one: Autonomy 
 
Autonomy can be broadly defined as self determination, the ability to do what one 
does independently, without being forced to do so by some outside power (Boden, 
2008). The literature describes various types of autonomy, however, the types that 
best describe autonomy as discussed here are exemplified by Kauffman (2003) 
who considers an autonomous agent to be a physical system that is able to act on 
its own behalf, capable of self-reproduction and at least capable of performing one 
thermodynamic work cycle; and, as Maturana and Verela (1992), who approach 
an autonomous agent without requiring it to possess self-reproductive and 
evolutionary capacities. These different types of autonomy can however co-exist: a 
persons autopoeitic identity, for instance, dies with him but some identity can be 
passed down by genetic and memetic inheritance mechanisms to his children.  
Immanuel Kant, as defended by Korsgaard, argued that “our autonomy is the 
source of our obligation”. In determining one‟s obligations by considering what a 
person with a practical identity can will as a law, one‟s authority – “the authority of 
your own mind and will” – “is beyond question and does not need to be 
established” (Gowans, 2002: 546-570).  
In biomedical ethics, one of the core principles in addressing a moral dilemma has 
been the respect for autonomy. Childress (1990:12-17), one of the strongest 
proponents and defenders of this concept after Immanuel Kant, argues that the 
principle of respect for autonomy is an important moral limit and it is limited. As a 
moral limit it, it constrains actions, but it is limited in its scope and weight and also 
complex in its application. He argues that the ideal of autonomy must be 
distinguished from the conditions of autonomy. Too often critics of the principle 
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target the controversial aspects of autonomy. They ignore aspects of first order 
autonomy and the yielding of decisions relating to that process. Abdication of first 
order autonomy suggests heteronomy, that is, rule by others, thus acknowledging 
that autonomy cannot be absolute. He argues further that respect for autonomy 
can be stated negatively as “it is wrong to subject the actions (including choices) of 
others to controlling influence”. This principle he says, provides the justificatory 
basis for the right to make autonomous decisions. This right in turn takes the form 
of specific autonomy related (if not autonomy- based) rights such as privacy and 
liberty. However, the principle also has positive implications, for example, in 
research, medicine and healthcare it engenders a positive or affirmative obligation 
to disclose information and foster autonomous decision-making. Childress seems 
to acknowledge the difficulty of autonomy or the autonomous processes of human 
beings. He raises these difficulties by examining issues such as temporality of a 
patient when making choices. Can we safely say, when acknowledging the 
complex processes of decision-making, that what a person decides now is a fixed 
decision? It is well described that consent is often given and later withdrawn 
depending on the changing of circumstances. He argues that those such as 
physicians, caring for patients should not just apply the principle of respect for 
autonomy mechanically but should employ good judgement. By accepting 
criticisms about the respect for autonomy, Childress concludes that we should go 
beyond the principle of respect for autonomy, in the sense of going beyond its 
misconceptions and distortions and in the sense of incorporating other relevant 
moral principles. He however pleads for us not to abandon this principle, but to 
recognise it for its value and its limits and complexity of application (ibid). We are 
therefore compelled to review the concept of autonomy. 
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Before we proceed with arguments for and against autonomy, we need to evaluate 
the origin of autonomy. With specific reference to biological agents, and humans in 
particular, the origin of autonomy could be placed at the beginning of time from 
either an evolutionary or a creationist perspective. If we look at various biological 
models of autopoeisis, then it becomes apparent that early chemical reactions had 
autonomic and self-perpetuating mechanisms that allowed continuation of a 
process. By looking at earlier autonomous processes, Fernando and Rowe (2008: 
355-383), remark that on the primitive earth there arose a recycling-flow reactor 
containing spontaneously formed oil droplets or lipid aggregates. These droplets 
grew at a basal rate by simple incorporation of lipid phase material, and divided by 
external agitation. This type of system was able to implement a natural algorithm 
once heredity was added, producing a chemical matrix. Arguing that macro 
evolution became possible once an autocatalytic process occurred within the 
matrix, doubling probably as fast as the lipid aggregate, they claim that no 
nucleotides or monomers capable of heredity were required at the onset. By 
developing a computer model of this process, they showed that this process 
evolved increasingly complex self sustaining processes of constitution, thus 
arguing that autonomous processes existed from the beginning of time. So 
autonomy having been part of natural processes from the beginning of time is 
perhaps inherent in the very fibre of man‟s being. Our thoughts, physiological 
processes and human interactions all driven by autonomous chemical processes 
that interact in concert to produce an ability to co-exist with other similar or 
dissimilar concerts of chemical processes exhibited in the form of everything that 
is perceived by the senses. The world as we know it thus exists of autonomic 
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processes that do not die or end but continue into different states of matter. Each 
state of matter in turn possessing its‟ own autonomy and having the ability to 
produce its‟ own continuous processes. 
 
The central theme throughout this discourse will be focusing on what controls this 
autonomic concert of chemical processes as displayed in one example, that of a 
human being,  and her interaction with her environment. The concept of man being 
a person will challenge this chemical autonomic perspective of humans. 
  
Moreno et al. (2008: 309-319) propose that autonomy should not be considered 
only in internal or constitutive terms but that the largely neglected interactive 
aspects stemming from it should be equally addressed. Autopoiesis, a naturalist 
conceptual theory, alluded to earlier, placed the notion of autonomy at the centre 
of the biological understanding of living beings in a particular moment when the 
atmosphere was probably more prepared for systemic developments than 
immediately before or after that, is challenged. It is too expansive in its definition 
because in fact the theory supposes that there is a recursive production of 
components that all have there own borders and only upon evolution do they 
interact to produce a self-maintaining dynamic, whose action brings about the 
constitution of the system as an operational unit (ibid). Contemporary naturalism 
aims to understand life and cognition as expressions of the autonomy of some 
material systems. This is in stark contrast to what we will examine later, where 
modernity places autonomy as a desired consequence of human faculty of reason. 
Life is intimately connected to autonomy, with autonomy being the main feature of 
life. Put conversely, if there is no autonomy then there is no life. Thus, for 
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example, artificial systems such as robots that are not regarded as autonomous 
cannot be seen to be alive. 
The concept of the person has received much deliberation in recent discussion of 
liberal political theory. At the heart of this discussion is a perspective of the rational 
agent. In liberal theories, the rational agent that is able to reflect rationally on her 
desires, character, values and commitments and is thus capable of choosing 
principles of justice to determine her outcome. This rational agent epitomises the 
liberal autonomous self. This has placed the concept of autonomy at the centre of 
controversies, since for a variety of liberal views, the fundamental value to be 
assumed and protected in a just society is the autonomy of the person, in 
particular her ability to rationally reflect and revise aspects of the self that form 
one‟s identity and commitments. Thus, autonomy is placed at the core of liberal 
theory. 
Christman (2001), challenges this liberal view of the autonomous agent. He 
argues that liberalism assumes that despite the fact that value orientations, 
commitments, and cultural identity often arise from factors outside an agent‟s 
control, everything is subjective to reflective revision. However it is also clear that 
even if some specific values and beliefs might be open to reflective revision, there 
are other aspects of our identity and selfhood that fundamentally orientate and 
shape those values that are not. These non-transformable aspects of the self are 
exemplified by the variation in each individual‟s bodily make-up and physicality. 
Background factors such as the contours of our physical frame, abilities involving 
movement, perception and personal interaction, and more general features of our 
physical existence structure our experience of both the world and our self-
conceptions, and typically do not enter the field of consciousness. Therefore, they 
 
16 
 
are not subject to normal exercises of critical appraisal and self alteration, yet they 
affect our judgement and structure choice. The way most people construct their life 
plans, preferences, dispositions, habits and values is set against a background of 
his or her biological sex. Choices are made given that one is male or female, 
never in determination of it.  Sexual orientation, for most people, is generally not a 
psychological phenomenon over which they have much ongoing control. While 
most will go through periods of searching and choice concerning the orientation of 
their sexual lives, and for such people choice may ultimately determine its 
outcome, there will be many others who will describe their sexual orientation as 
something discovered or assumed and psychologically unalterable. 
 
Long-standing emotional ties and deep affective connections come in a variety of 
types and vary over time and are often subject to the deliberate control of their 
participants. However, many such emotional attachments are best described as a 
psychological fact of a person‟s life, as a set structure within which a person 
makes choices and guides her life but are not subject to ongoing reflective control 
(e.g. the love of a parent for a now adult child). It would be regarded by many as 
crazy to consider such love as subject to reflective control and possible disavowal 
or rejection). 
 
Another non-transformable aspect that has to be considered is the cultural ethnic 
and racial orientation of an agent. While some agents may subject their cultural 
and racial identity to rational reflection, especially the meaning it has for them, and 
perhaps reject these meanings in the light of such an evaluation, many others 
would describe their relation to such an identity as an all-enveloping background 
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fact about their lives, an organizing matrix within which they choose and 
deliberate, not an aspect open to modification. These examples, Christman (2001) 
argues, show that if the capacity for reflection is meant to apply to any particular 
factor that shapes values and commitments, and a wide array of such factors are 
not subject to deliberate control, then insofar as autonomy requires such powers of 
self- modification, it applies more narrowly than is traditionally thought (ibid).                  
Schwartz (2004: 215-228) challenges Christman‟s argument by pointing out that 
such reasoning would result in many agents being regarded as non-autonomous. 
He argues that by distinguishing between normal and normative autonomy, which 
would entail recognizing personal autonomy as having degrees, the difficulty of 
non-autonomous agents and subsequent paternalistic approaches to agents would 
be avoided. He argues that the point presented is that autonomy is portrayed as 
something one either has or does not have. He states that a significant flaw in 
Christman‟s argument is that it masks levels of autonomy that individuals lack in 
relation to different aspects of themselves. Christman‟s model is an account of 
normal autonomy in that it requires only certain minimal capacities for autonomy 
and because it is constructed for the purpose of defining the threshold of 
autonomy through which a person must pass in order to be regarded as worthy of 
moral respect. A normative account, however deals with higher levels of autonomy 
that can serve other important social functions. Normal autonomy is to be 
regarded as the lower level of normative autonomy. The high point of normative 
autonomy is unattainable (ibid). In support of Christman‟s argument it becomes 
apparent then that if the minimal conditions of rationality are not achieved then an 
individual cannot be regarded as autonomous. This then would exclude all 
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individuals who do not possess the capacity for rational reflection. Schwartz 
realigns autonomy again as broader than Christman challenges it to be. 
 
Varelius (2003: 363-379) argues that the traditional approach of autonomy to 
biomedical ethics has usually led to a subjective theory of well-being on the basis 
of commitment to the value of autonomy and to the view that well being is always 
relative to the subject. Subjective theories make our well being dependent on our 
attitudes of favour and disfavour. Objective theories would deny this dependency. 
Thus when we are tasked with assessing what is good for an agent, the subjective 
theories of well being will advise us to consult the agent whose well-being is 
assessed, to pay attention to her own preferences and attitudes of favour and 
disfavour. On the other hand, objective theories would maintain that an agent‟s 
well being is not decided by her own desires and attitudes of favour or disfavour, 
but often by a list of things that are considered to be good for a person. It would 
thus appear that objective theories of well-being would be incompatible with 
autonomy, because only subjective theories of well–being are capable of 
respecting an agent‟s own decisions in an appropriate way. Varelius (2003) argues 
that is false. If a person‟s decisions, beliefs, desires are due to such external 
influences such as unreflected socialization, manipulation, coercion and 
brainwashing, then they are not autonomous but heteronomous. If a person‟s 
beliefs concerning a particular matter are false, inconsistent with each other, or 
she is insufficiently informed about that matter, then she is not autonomous with 
respect to that matter. Autonomy, she also argues, admits to varying degrees and 
is a continuum. Thus an agent at different phases and with respect to different 
circumstances of her life can occupy different positions at different times. By giving 
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the example of an individual with terminal cancer who decides to commit suicide, 
she argues that the individual, by subjective reasoning, should be allowed to end 
her life, autonomously. However from an objective list theory, she would not 
necessarily be allowed to end her life if suicide was not regarded as a prudential 
act on the list. This would be regardless of whether she no longer wanted to suffer 
from her illness. The importance of autonomy on this objective list would weigh 
more than the individual‟s subjective reasoning, because autonomy would be 
regarded as an important “good” to have on this list. She concludes her argument 
by stating that objective list theorists would have to construct this list taking into 
account the various values individuals have and the relative importance these may 
have in their own right. By not excluding objective list theorists and the importance 
they may ascribe to autonomy, she argues that even though subjective 
approaches to autonomy are highly regarded, one should still consider alternate 
theories on the importance of autonomy.  
Schiktanz (2007:30) argues that despite bioethics describing the body as material 
and distinct from mind or as dynamic and socially interconnected, we always deal 
with a value-laden phenomenon. The body is then not only the locus (where 
intervention or action takes place), because it is regarded as the carrier of, or 
vehicle for, the decisive wishes or preferences or interests of a person, but is also 
socially or culturally constructed. Four aspects of autonomy are presented. 
Autonomy, it is argued, is the right to bodily self determination primarily for the 
defence of one‟s own body against direct and indirect interventions by third 
parties; it is the respect for another person‟s bodily integrity, even if it conflicts with 
one‟s own preferences and aims of action; it is the self critical reflection that 
includes the fulfilment of individual interpretations of what the good life is and 
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includes a form of care and concern for the body and finally it is the opportunity 
and a capacity to develop a self that has the right to one‟s own social identity 
within the framework of group membership (ibid).  Once again we see the different 
aspects of autonomy and how they are integrated into the perspective of what 
bodies are about. This exemplifies the notion that autonomy, either as ascriptional 
(the subjective ascription to an agent) or genuine (the fact that an agent is 
characterised by a certain property), is not absolute (Rohde and Stewart, 2008: 
424-433). 
In concluding this chapter it becomes apparent that embodiment as a concept has 
a significant role to play in the perception of man‟s autonomy. Although there are 
conflicting arguments as to its importance and the position it should occupy in the 
outcome of decision-making, it still posits itself as a concept to be contended with 
in any ethical dilemma. 
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Chapter Two: Embodiment 
 
The concept of embodiment is a central tenet of phenomenology. The idea that 
our experience is not a private domain but a way of being-in-the-world draws on 
the tradition initiated with the work and school of Edmund G. A. Husserl (1895-
1938). He attempts to overcome the Cartesian body-mind dualism that pervades 
Modernity by viewing intentionality as the distinctive mark of consciousness. He 
argues that a conscious experience is not only an element in a stream of 
consciousness, but also an aspect of an object. Consciousness is our access to 
the world. Husserl reacted against Hegel‟s dialectal pluralism; he did not see the 
world as a clash of conflicting visions, and believed that the world was constituted 
by consciousness. For him, phenomenology was the scientific study of the 
essential structures of consciousness, a method for finding and guaranteeing the 
truth (Blackburn 1996: 284-285). Phenomenology analyses whatever is 
experienced: thoughts, pain, emotions, memories etc (Dreyfus 1987: 254-277). As 
an object of our own awareness, we are merely an empirical self, a component of 
the contingent world, accidental like everything else. Husserl‟s Dasein is the self-
conscious subject. Each of us must come to terms with one‟s own contingency 
and find a meaning in contingency itself. Dasein recognises others of its kind. In 
response, Dasein enters that condition called “being-for-others”. One‟s life is 
transformed by the awareness of how one seems in the consciousness of others 
(Scruton 1997: 227). 
In Being and Time (1928), Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), Husserl‟s student, is 
more concerned about the significance of morality, about how to live 
“authentically”, that is with integrity, in a complex and confusing world. Heidegger 
rejects any body-mind dualism, any subject-object distinction, and the linguistic 
separation of consciousness/experience/mind. Dasein is being-in-the-world. The 
self is discovered in profound moments of unique self-recognition (Solomon and 
Higgins 1996: 266-304). 
In Phenomenology of Perception (1962), Maurice Merleau-Ponty affirms that the 
body is the vehicle of being-in-the-world. It is to be intervolved in a definite 
environment to identify oneself with certain projects and be continually committed 
to them. In Totality and Infinity (1969), Emmanuel Levinas argues that the body is 
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deeply infused with questions relating to values rather than an inert object of 
scientific knowledge or therapeutic action. The body is the source of meaning and 
of meaning creation. 
Against his teacher‟s, Heidegger‟s,  view about the nothingness of being, and the 
stark divide between human beings and the rest of the world, Hans Jonas (2001: 
282) alerts us to an ethical imperative emanating from the plenitude of being. 
Value is present throughout living nature. 
 
The creation of human life, that which is perhaps most valued by humans, requires 
that a spermatozoon from the male species fertilizes the egg cell produced from 
the female. During copulation several million (in fertile men more than 100 million) 
spermatozoa are released from the male and compete to fertilise one egg cell. 
Only one spermatozoon will be successful in the fertilisation process. The rest will 
die off and be progressively discharged from the female‟s body. The union of the 
egg and spermatozoon (syngamy) then begins a process of cell division and 
differentiation, producing a human embryo. This human embryo will continue 
developing in the uterus until birth.  
What a human body consists in from a metaphysical sense and what it means to 
be human has and always will be a subject of controversy and contention. Issues 
such as when can a human embryo be considered to be alive and the like abound 
in academic ethical discourse. For the purposes of this paper we need to consider 
that an embryo is in fact the early components of what we regard as the human 
body. It has the potential of embodying everything a human is and may someday 
desire and turn out to be. 
There are three main arguments that broadly govern discussions on embodiment: 
monism, dualism and pluralism. 
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Monism deals with the concept that a human body consists entirely of matter and 
is part of the natural processes of life on earth. There is no soul or spirit and thus 
the human embryo is a mass of cells that eventually differentiates and develops 
specialized tissue and organs that work synergistically to eventually form a human 
being. This being has no pre-programmed mind. The mind develops as the infant 
develops and this is by and large a factor of its environmental interaction and 
stimulation of the sense organs. 
 
Dualism presents an argument that a human body possesses a spirit or soul that 
attributes it its life and purpose. Pluralism defines a human body as consisting of 
several different substances from a metaphysical sense. If we are to pursue the 
two major views, namely monism and dualism, in the understanding of a human 
body then we will indeed arrive at two different positions when discussing moral 
issues surrounding human life. For example if we are to accept that humans have 
souls that are given from some external source, it could well be argued that when 
the human body that possesses that soul dies, then the soul may return to its 
source in whatever form. Thus the perception of the body in that context would 
imply that it was merely a vessel that housed the soul. This chapter deals with 
these challenges of what the body is or is perceived to be and, in our attempt to 
answer these questions, reviews concepts of embodiment.  
The body has been traditionally viewed as either a physical object void of the 
influences of the mind or as a complex dynamic and socially interconnected 
phenomenon. If the body is viewed purely as a physical object then we can argue 
that from the time of fertilisation, the body is a mass of self-dividing and self-
determining cells that are co-ordinated and governed by pure chemical and 
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physical reactions and principles. There are no other forces outside of these 
processes that direct the outcome of this body and its interactions with its 
environment. The development of the mind that controls this body would also be 
said to have spontaneously developed from the same or as yet undefined 
processes that produced the physical body. The body, so defined, would interact 
with its surroundings and so determine its own outcome. If it is exposed to 
carcinogenic agents it may lead to cancer which may determine its death. Once 
dead the body then in its decomposition process or other process of interment 
such as cremation will return to its various physical and chemical components. 
This view would hold that everything real and unreal would not be subject to the 
supernatural, everything would be natural or at one with each other (Chambers, 
1935:113-119).  
However, if we consider a dualistic approach to embodiment, we find that the body 
may indeed be host to a living “soul” or living mind. The human body, it has been 
argued by Descartes, is a living organism that embodies a living mind (Zaner, 
1981: 30). How do humans progress from conception to being active, interactive, 
social and intelligent adult beings? There are many different answers. If we pursue 
the idea that a human body serves to merely envelope a different substance such 
as a soul, then we are bound to consider that the body is purely a vessel much as 
a boatsman is in a boat. When the boatsman leaves the boat and does not return, 
then that boat may be possessed or stolen by another boatsman. If there is no 
possession of the boat by any other boatsman, then the boat would essentially rot 
in the water and subsequently decay. This view would open arguments that would 
support theological views of demonic possession and so forth. The human body, it 
could be argued is then not an integrated part of the possessor, but merely 
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parasitized for the ultimate folly or use of the possessor. This view would have to 
accept the existence of “souls”, in a religious rather than an Aristotelian sense of 
the concept, that are waiting to inhabit human concepti perhaps from the moment 
of their formation. The “soul” would then be directing the outcome of the body. If 
the body and its interactions with its environment were not influential on the soul, 
the soul would thus have its own character and maintain that character until it 
decides to “leave” the body. However, if the body and its interactions with the 
environment were to influence the soul, then the initial character of the soul would 
be changed as the body progressed through life. The soul, then in this relationship 
with the body, may be said to be dependant on the body for its outcome. Thus we 
may explore issues such as to what extent does the interactive environment of the 
body affect the outcome of the soul. Here there are many unanswered questions. 
One particular bioethical conundrum would fit in very well with this perspective. If 
the body were to influence the outcome of the soul, then we would have to 
consider that the soul will be influenced and develop the character of what is “fed” 
in by the body and mind. Thus if the mind were to become schizophrenic or senile 
as in old age, would it be prudent to assume that the character of the soul would 
be schizophrenic and senile and if it were to be judged in some “here-after” by 
some “god” would it be judged as such? If we are to assume that the soul was to 
leave the body when these events occurred, then is the body still autonomous or 
to be deemed a person or human? Would we have a reason based on this to 
terminate these lives as they were no longer part of the human race? After all they 
would be soulless! 
The existence of the mind and its relationship with the body presents another 
dualistic theory. The mind it is argued will develop according to its sensory input 
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(ibid). Thus the presence of sensory organs is vital for the development of the 
mind. If there are no sensory organs then there could be no mind. The human 
body would then be a shell, a mass of tissue with basic physiological functions 
unable to interact meaningfully with the world. It may then not even be considered 
a human being by some descriptions. This would then logically imply that a body 
without senses is not a human being. Autism constitutes a perplexing condition in 
this regard. 
Zaner (1981:182-188) explores and argues that autistic children suffer from the 
consequences of having lost themselves, or of never having been able to discover 
themselves, since they were unable to establish contact with others. If the child 
ever does come to the point of attempting to interact with others, it is both 
agonizing and fascinating to witness the enduring fear she has that at any 
moment, she may disintegrate, disappear literally. These children often touch 
themselves frequently or do not sleep for weeks, almost in an attempt to reaffirm 
connection with their bodies (ibid). Dr Leo Kanner (1942:217-250) who first 
identified autism as a distinct clinical phenomenon presented an explanation of its 
signs and symptoms which included linguistic peculiarities such as echolalia, 
pronominal reversal, inappropriate talk, rote enumerations, and the peculiar way in 
which the child‟s relation to other persons is disrupted, and the unusual way of 
relating to objects. He argued that these symptoms could be explained by the 
child‟s characteristic isolation, aloneness and the powerful desire for the 
preservation of sameness. Invariably, they do not communicate with their 
surroundings. When communication with others is stopped, or never initiated, and 
when the very presence of the world is blocked in crucial ways, not only is the 
world impoverished, but so is the person and its embodied self. With the failure to 
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develop links with the outside world, there is a strictly correlated impoverishment 
and debilitation of mental life. In fact, their lives seem rigorously embedded in a 
very limited subjective sphere where feelings for the most part are extinguished, 
cognition is markedly missing, passion is apparently diminished or distorted, and 
there is little apparent volitional or valuational life (Zaner, 1981:186). The autistic 
child is not without senses but it‟s expressional behaviour in the world renders it 
far from being independent. Is it to be regarded as a true human being? Its mind 
may not be able to be interpreted but indeed it is housed within a human body that 
has the characteristics of the human family. Thus the body minus the mind or 
rather the absence of the mind could still be considered human. This is a direct 
challenge to the way the body has been viewed traditionally. Only in recent times 
has the body been afforded the due respect that it had prior to the modern 
analytical philosophical treatises which were founded on the assumption that 
concepts, propositions, logical forms, functions and all the basic functions of 
thought had virtually nothing to do with the nature of our bodies. Consequently this 
dominant philosophical tradition simply ignored the body (Johnson 1999: 82-101). 
The mind held utmost importance and the effect of the mind in determining the 
outcome of the body was regarded as supreme. What would a reasonable person 
do under certain circumstances pervaded most instances of our moral behaviour. 
It is obvious that to be reasonable one has to have the faculty of reason. This is a 
basic and inherent function of the mind. 
 
Embodiment may also be viewed at the following three levels: neurophysiological, 
cognitive unconscious and phenomenological. Neurophysiological: - our 
experience, conceptualizations and thought are realized neurally. That is they are 
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embodied in neural assemblies and their interactions. The human neural network 
develops through interactions with the physical, social, moral and political 
environment, and is thus integrally linked to other physical attributes of the body. 
Cognitive unconscious: - the vast majority of our concepts, syntactic mechanisms 
and other cognitive structures operate for us automatically and unreflectively. For 
the most part our conceptual systems operate beneath the level of consciousness. 
Our cognitive mechanisms and structures are grounded in patterns of bodily 
experience and activity, such as our spatial and temporal orientations, the patterns 
of our bodily movements, and the way we manipulate objects. Mental images, 
image schemas, metaphors, concepts and inference patterns are all tied, directly 
or indirectly, to these bodily structures of our sensorimotor activities. 
Phenomenological: - this concerns the felt quality of our experiences. Embodied 
description at this level seeks to bring us to awareness of how our experience 
subjectively feels to us and how our world reveals itself. An important task in such 
a description is to recover the ordinarily submerged presence of our bodies in what 
we experience, feel and think. The goal is to uncover the tacit, background 
dimension of experience that is mediated by our embodiment and without which 
we would have no meaningful thought or symbolic expression of any kind (ibid). In 
this discourse these levels will converge and evolve simultaneously as we 
describe various states of embodiment. In the next section I will present case 
studies to demonstrate the effect that these views of embodiment have on 
autonomy. 
 
In this section human physiological, psychological and disease states will be 
presented to show the impact that embodiment has on autonomy. 
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From syngamy the zygote considered a “pre- embryo” needs to implant into the 
uterus for further development. This discourse proposes an argument that this 
early life form possesses some sort of inherent value that needs to be respected. 
In its own right the “pre-embryo” may be considered to be autonomous yet 
dependent on its host for sustenance and development. If the pregnant woman 
consumes excessive amounts of alcohol or other toxins that will affect the 
development of the embryo/foetus, the resultant infant will be significantly 
disadvantaged in a world of “normal” people. It will not be able to reason 
effectively if it does not possess a “sound” mind or be able to compete effectively 
on the sports field if it has, for example, a spastic paresis. These forms of 
embodiment may limit the expression of any autonomous process that seems to 
be a function of the mind exemplified most often in the action of the body. 
 
Females, throughout history, by virtue of possessing the human characteristics 
that make them female, have in many cultures been denied the dignity of being 
human let alone autonomous. Some African cultures do not allow women to 
become economically independent and they are thus subject to the dominance of 
the spouse. Cornwall (2007:149-168) argues that female solidarity and female 
autonomy are two closely held ideals. Ideas about female solidarity and female 
autonomy appear in many gender and development interventions. By getting 
women into groups, they may be transformed into social, economic and political 
stakeholders. These notions are further expounded to the extent that if women get 
into parliament they will represent women‟s interests and if they have access to 
independent incomes they will be freed from dependency on men. By interviewing 
and having focus group discussions, Cornwall, discovered contradictions to this 
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notion. In Ado-Odo, a village in Nigeria, she observed that the cultural traditions 
did not allow women to necessarily share the same solidarity. The women in this 
village appeared to be the dominant sex in terms of trading. They essentially ran 
the market place and by and large interacted only with other women. Despite 
appearing to be in solidarity with each other, they were instead making the lives of 
other women within both their social network and same household a nightmare. 
These relationships are often not spoken about in feminist literature, as they 
affront the very notion of feminism. The women were establishing hierarchies 
within their social networks that were no different from how men were behaving 
towards them. What surprised Cornwall even more was that despite many of these 
women being financially independent and economically powerful, they still 
appeared not to be autonomous. They had to consult their husbands or sons 
regarding day to day issues. It became apparent that women sought personal 
wealth so that they could be more “attractive” to their husbands. Stories were told 
as to how husbands varied their treatment of their wives depending on their 
wealth. Women, it would appear, were still slaves to their husbands and other 
men. It was as though a woman has to “work” her way into the heart of her 
spouse. African feminist writers criticise this “Western” feminist perspective of 
African women. Ogundipe-Leslie (1994:251) contends that all African women have 
multiple identities evolving and accreting over time, enmeshed in one individual. 
Yet African women continue to be looked at and looked for in their coital and 
conjugal sites which seem to be a pre-occupation of many Western analysts and 
feminists. She argues that this misunderstanding does not address the role of 
women in African culture and in the stability of African families.  
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Thus it appears that not only is it difficult to be autonomous as embodied with 
female attributes, but it also depends on the land of your birth, your culture, sexual 
orientation, religion and perhaps even the colour of your skin. 
In the South African apartheid years, the colour of your skin determined your right 
to be fully autonomous. If you were black you generally could not reject any 
advances by a white person. For example women in Black academic maternity 
hospitals could not reject the treatment from a White physician based on race, 
whereas a White woman could refuse treatment on race if care was offered by a 
Black physician. 
Fessenden (1999: 23-40) echoes this sentiment. In the United States of America, 
she argues, the problem with trying to think about whiteness as a racial category, 
is that whiteness, in film as in other forms of cultural representation, seems not to 
be there as a subject at all. Whiteness seems to stand for so much more than 
race: safety and radiance for example, as opposed to danger and darkness. White 
racism she argues trades on an invisibility that makes it difficult to analyse 
whiteness. By recalling the atrocities of America‟s own racial past, she defines the 
difficulty of being embodied within the body of an African American. Negroes were 
regarded as a lesser rung on the evolutionary ladder. They did not possess the 
capacity of thought and were even soulless, as the God of the white man was 
white and man was made in His image and likeness. This racist ideology was so 
pervasive that it defined African Americans, irrespective of their colour, as lesser 
beings not capable of defining their own future by self-determination. The white 
man had to think for them and decide their future. When more liberal views of race 
gained momentum and African Americans were eventually given equal status, 
those who had defined and propagated the inferiority of the African American were 
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already well on their way to redefining race. The rendering of newer ways of 
viewing the soul, such as defining that souls of different race groups having 
different outcomes in the hereafter, were proselytized so that whites were still 
differentiated from blacks and blacks were still labelled as being lesser beings 
(ibid). 
 
One‟s sexual orientation, in particular homosexuality, also comes into the debate. 
If you are homosexual, then you too may suffer severe criticism and punishment 
for being embodied this way. At one point in history, to be homosexual was to be 
deemed suffering from a psychiatric disorder that required intensive intervention, 
even institutionalization. Homosexuals were, and in some countries still are, 
regarded as being incapable of possessing autonomy (O‟Connell, 1999: 62-63). 
 
The religious persuasion of individuals has also impacted on autonomy. In the war 
against terrorism the United States of America has waged war against Islamic 
fundamentalism. Indeed here we find a liberal Western culture violating that which 
they most respect; the rights and the autonomy of an agent. Because many 
Muslims adhere to a particular dress code and many if not most have certain 
“stereotypical” physical features (Arab), the American Department of Homeland 
Security has utilised these criteria to risk stratify individuals who live and enter the 
United States of America. They may even arrest you without trial on suspicion of 
terrorism and imprison you at Guantanamo Bay (Foley, 2007:1009-1070). Thus 
being Muslim in a country such as the United States of America may limit your 
autonomy.  
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Likewise Islamic fundamentalists inhibit, often viciously, the autonomy of Muslim 
females. Women are often killed for violating the code of conduct that befits a 
righteous Muslim woman, often by the men in her own family. 
 
The latter discussion presented the challenges that particular bodies face in the 
“healthy” discourse of life. How differently are diseased bodies viewed? 
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Chapter three: Diseased bodies and autonomy 
 
This chapter deals with examples of how diseased bodies are challenged to 
exercise their autonomy. It explores practical dilemmas to emphasise the impact 
that embodiment has on autonomy.    
Moser et al (2006: 357-365) reviewed the challenges nurses face when dealing 
with nurse-led shared care. Shared care models define needs-based care for 
chronically ill people. In these models, specialist nurses play a significant role 
because they are the main professional caregivers for people with chronic 
conditions which require continuing care. One of the key aims of this type of care 
is encouraging patients to take an active role in management of their condition. 
They argue that patient autonomy is a cornerstone of nurse-led, shared care. This 
autonomy they argue is reached by both positive and negative freedoms. Patients, 
they stress, cannot make self determined decisions without the support of others. 
They also conclude that nurses cannot rely on only one exclusive model of 
autonomy, but that they should provide a combined approach, which according to 
this study, was preferred by patients. It appears from this study that a chronic 
disease seems to remove a component of the process of autonomous functioning. 
Nurse-led shared care seems to fill that gap and thereby restores autonomous 
function. This then begs the question that if an agent does not have a nurse, their 
completeness to function autonomously is significantly limited. 
Grootenhuis et al (2006) examined the outcome of children with end stage renal 
disease with regard to their developmental milestones and functioning in adult life. 
They found that adults with end stage renal disease since childhood achieved 
developmental milestones much later in life. Patients achieved fewer milestones 
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than their peers with respect to autonomy development, social development and 
psychosexual behaviour. They displayed less risky behaviour and those who 
achieved fewer social milestones exhibited more emotional problems and less 
vitality and had a less overall mental quality of life. They explain the impact that 
the disease has on the patient‟s development of autonomy. The disease requires 
that children be dialysed. The result of this is that children do not interact socially 
with their peers; their parents may become over protective and make decisions for 
them. The parents are reluctant to discipline or have expectations for the child. 
This attitude inhibits the child from developing the personal skills needed to cope 
with the extra challenge of the disease. There is also delayed sexual development 
and sexuality is closely linked to a person‟s self-concept and self esteem. As 
adolescents they become marginalised by their peers, rejected at a time when 
body image and identity so largely depend on conformity. Having a chronic 
disease further complicates the transition to full independent existence. The 
adolescent often struggles to cope with tertiary education and fulltime employment 
(Grootenhuis et al, 2006:538-544). All these factors limit normal and 
developmental processes that are essential for the development of an 
autonomous adult being. 
Mentally ill patients are a group of patients who are commonly treated as though 
they are not autonomous beings because of their inability to reason for 
themselves. This ability has generally been assessed using the so-called test of 
capacity. Chiswick (2005:1469-1470) raises concerns over this test of capacity in 
mentally ill patients. Traditionally mental health laws protected those mentally ill 
patients who through the lack of insight are a danger to themselves or others. He 
argues that these laws may however not be relevant in modern society where 
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there are contemporary concerns over patient autonomy. The test for decision 
making capacity he argues is important, but not enough to over-ride all other 
considerations. Capacity he states has not earned this pivotal status for the 
following reasons: it is a poorly defined concept; it is consequentially difficult to 
assess; its assessment adds little of practical benefit when considering the clinical 
grounds for compulsory treatment; and its alleged presence will be used as a 
convenient device to legitimise rejection and delay in treatment of mentally ill 
patients. Furthermore he argues that the Scottish legislature recognizing the 
difficulty of the test for capacity uses “decision making ability”. There is no real 
difference between these concepts because despite the claims that decision 
making ability is in the mind and capacity a function of the brain, they depend on 
the ability to understand, reason, make an informed choice, and communicate. 
Capacity is a fluctuating commodity. The state of mind of a patient fluctuates, often 
resisting treatment but hoping that someone will intervene. It is known that it is 
easier to assess capacity in patients with chronic but stable conditions such as a 
learning disability than in those with acute mental disorders, in which fluctuations 
in capacity are the rule rather than the exception. Criticising the Scottish criteria for 
compulsory medical/psychiatric treatment he argues that in a study conducted on 
mentally ill patients, it was shown that patients perfectly understood an explanation 
that they were mentally ill but did not accept it; they fully appreciated the 
importance of information given to them, but they reasoned that treatment would 
be harmful. They expressed the choice not to have treatment, even if left 
homeless. Thus capacity had nothing to do with the fact that they lacked insight 
into a harmful dangerous mental illness that would mandate compulsory medical 
treatment (ibid). Mentally ill patients thus seemingly possess capacity but not 
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autonomy. Professionals who treat mentally ill patients may feel that their 
professional autonomy is undermined when suggestions that what has been 
traditionally been a cornerstone in psychiatry, capacity, is threatened by 
challenges to the concept. A review examining the impact of a multidisciplinary 
approach to the management of mentally ill patients showed that  professionals 
felt their autonomy less challenged when there was a family participation in the 
management of these patients (Truman, 2005: 572-575). 
Patients who suffer from a terminal illness and wish to die by either refusing life 
sustaining treatment or requesting the assistance of a physician face denial to 
their requests in many countries. The request is often based on the mind 
agonizing over its diseased body and wanting to be relieved of the burden, this 
embodiment, that it finds itself in. Thus the mind is driving this autonomous pursuit 
of death, yet if it is unable to convince the body or other thinking bodies that it 
wishes to depart, it will remain entrapped within an ailing body. The bodies around 
the diseased body could, from a respect for autonomy perspective, not recognize 
that the diseased body‟s mind was making a rational decision, because the body 
in which it was embodied had influenced it to the extent of irrationality. 
These clinical examples demonstrate the difficulty of implementing the principle of 
respect for autonomy in making ethical decisions. It appears that a broader 
principle should be presented that would look at the body as an all encompassing 
entity to deal with ethical dilemmas. Such a principle could be the respect for 
personhood. The next chapter explores this concept. 
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Chapter Four: Respect For Embodiment 
 
I have shown that respect for autonomy is not an absolute principle. By this I mean 
that absolute principles cannot conflict, and if they cannot conflict then a vital 
aspect of our moral lives (that is, conflict) has been left out. By dissecting what 
autonomy and embodiment means, I have shown that there are significant flaws in 
marrying the concepts as they are perceived practically. Different views of 
embodiment challenge the way we see bodies and thus the way we understand 
the embodied mind. The functioning of the mind has been regarded as supreme 
by modernist philosophical theories and quite frankly these theorists forgot about 
bodies. The complex nature of modern human existence demands that we view 
bodies differently.  
Thus a proposal for a concept, the respect for embodiment, would not be out of 
place in this discourse. 
Physicist John Polkinghorne claims that a grand unified “Theory of Everything” 
must include and reconcile quantum mechanics, general relativity theory and the 
personhood of human beings (Sullivan, 2001: 177-186). A person, Polkinghorne, 
defines is a self conscious being, able to use the future tense in anticipation, hope 
and dread; able to perceive meaning and to assign value; able to respond to 
beauty and to the call of moral duty; able to love other persons, even to the point 
of self sacrifice (ibid). This concept is not shared by all however. Sullivan (2001), 
reviews personhood from a “pre-Roe” and “post-Roe” (referring to the landmark 
USA Supreme Court‟s Roe v Wade decision of 1973) perspective. Before this 
landmark case a strong Judeo-Christian influence defined a person. The human 
body was regarded as a person that possessed a soul from the time of conception. 
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Abortion was regarded as killing a human person irrespective of the age of the 
foetus. The courts ruled that a human foetus was not an autonomous being and 
the autonomy of the mother trumped that of the non-autonomous foetus. There 
was no consideration for the personhood of the foetus. This decision set the 
precedent in bioethics as to how we would view bodies‟ post 1973.  
Earlier I alluded to bodies that are deemed to be without autonomy such as the 
person diagnosed with schizophrenia, senility, autism and perhaps the comatose, 
and yet we see them as having value, to be counted as part of the human race. To 
kill them would be taking human life and that would be murder. A utilitarian 
argument that supports abortion would not view the survival of foetus as being for 
the greater good, if it resulted in psychophysical trauma to the mother or an 
increase in the world population with limited resources. It would condone the killing 
of a foetus but not necessarily the senile. These ethical dilemmas could not be 
adequately answered if we continued the support for the respect of the autonomy 
of a human being. We would therefore have to relook at what personhood is and 
define it such that it would transcend deontological or utilitarian arguments. 
In earlier arguments, the way the body is perceived was discussed from monistic, 
dualistic and pluralistic viewpoints. The common factor in all the views is the 
respect shown for the existence of not only the mind or the soul but also for the 
body. Without the body these other entities would not exist. That is they may exist 
elsewhere as metaphysical concepts but not embodied.  
A human body then would essentially require a body and something within it that 
gave it life and value. However we could also argue that it is of value in itself and 
requires no other metaphysical attribute to possess value. As some are not 
comfortable with the concept of souls and as we cannot explore the internal 
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machinations of certain bodies, we cannot just abandon the concepts of the mind 
and the soul if we are attempting to propose a principle that should have universal 
implications. We could instead call everything that is not seen or perceived other 
than the body, yet acutely aware that there is something, that others believe to be 
present, simply “the other”. The evaluation of this other in terms of defining the 
outcome and action of the body would not be possible because this other would be 
manifest in various ways. It may be non expressive as in the autistic child, 
delusional in the senile or dormant in the comatose. This otherness that inhabits 
the body would not necessarily be void of any religious affiliation, philosophical 
predilection or political affiliation. The character of the other would be defined by a 
reciprocal relation with the body. It is this concept of the other integrated with the 
body that would constitute the person. Respect for the personhood so defined 
would result in a respect for bodies irrespective of the desires of the mind. The 
body then would not be seen to be driven by the autonomous mind, but be seen 
as a whole and not parts of a whole. Zaner (1981: 27) however challenges that the 
body is a biological affair and as such properly the concern of the biological and 
medical sciences and practices. Ethics and values like “persons” and “souls” are 
unscientific and properly metaphysical and not physical, and the metaphysical 
cannot be considered as dependent upon the physical. A rebuttal would declare 
that the other, even though a metaphysical concept is integral to the body it is 
interdependent on the physical. 
The respect for embodiment thus proposed would have significant consequences 
for many practical bioethical applications. Consent and confidentiality, two of the 
most important bioethical concepts, would be challenged. Consent to medical 
intervention holds that a person understands what they are consenting to. It bases 
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its strength on the respect for autonomous choice. This discourse has highlighted 
that certain forms of embodiment may not be in a position to decide their own 
outcome. They needed a next of kin or other authority to decide this for them. We 
then have to follow a bureaucratic process that would essentially absolve the 
person giving consent from any procedure or intervention that is to be done. The 
assumption is often that the person who is unable to give consent, and if they were 
they able to reason, would have decided that the intervention or procedure is in 
their best interest. The dilemma that arises often is, and barring a living will, what 
would the comatose person wish for her body in this state of an “absent mind”. 
Medical practitioners practicing in a modern environment and with significant 
technical modalities are able to keep a body alive despite some of the most 
challenging afflictions. The question is should they be doing this when they do not 
know what the embodied person really would like to happen to it. If we are to 
assume a utilitarian outlook, then we could in circumstance of different resource 
availabilities, decide what would be in the interest of the greater good. 
Deontologists on the other hand could support the preservation of the body in that 
the body should not be seen as a means to an end but as an end in itself. So how 
would the respect for embodiment resolve this dilemma? An embodied being 
possesses “the other”, and as such it should be respected. The collective desires 
of “the other” and the body and as expressed through the body should be 
respected. If the aim of the embodied other from conception was about life, and 
we have observed that process through scientific studies, then when the body, in 
all its different forms, cannot express itself, then we should preserve life, 
irrespective of the quality, because that is the aim of “the other”. The respect for 
embodiment would allow the wishes of those bodies who cannot express 
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themselves not to be subjected to tests of capacity regarding their decisions. The 
terminally ill who wish to die, would have their requests granted and no 
consideration to their states of mind would have to be considered. There are many 
other more contentious ethical dilemmas that would have to be waded through in 
determining their outcome, but at least we would have to consider the body and 
rely on the respect for autonomy when we cannot find any within a body. 
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Concluding remarks 
Various approaches exist outside the utilitarian and Kantian  
mainstreams of normative ethics; some of these draw on  
phenomenology, some on the Marxian tradition, and some on  
the revival of the ideas of Aristotelian ethics…The role of reason,  
in its hypostatised Enlightenment form, is taken for granted,  
and the possible foundational role of the virtues, or the  
fact of embodiment or sociality, is excluded from consideration 
as a matter of principle (Komesaroff,1995: 8). 
 
The body in all its forms is the subject of bioethics. Without the body there would 
be no debate around medical and psychosocial ethical dilemmas. There would be 
no need to discuss aesthetics or fashion. Its presence is beheld by the five 
physical senses. It is interpreted within its social and cultural environment, but its 
actions, the culmination of its interconnectivity with everything else is measured by 
philosophical discourse. The how and why it behaves in different circumstances 
are judged to be correct or appropriate by theories that govern the ultimate destiny 
of its very existence. 
Autonomy has been the key aspect of how its intent or actions have been 
measured over the past half century. This concept I have shown has ignored the 
form and function of the body. Bodies were dependent on independent observers 
for their outcome. If the body fitted into a description of being self conscious, it was 
ascribed autonomy. Yet its actions needed to fit in with a favourable outcome, 
often for the greater good. It was deemed to be an end in itself yet often the 
means to an end. Autonomy has failed the body in many instances. These have 
been described and the examples presented, have revealed its inadequacy in 
dealing with several forms of embodiment. 
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The different forms the body takes, diseased or not, has shown that the impact on 
the principle of respect for autonomy needed to be revisited. The other and its 
otherness, the very substance embodied in each one of us needs to be respected. 
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